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THREE PERSPECTIVES                                    
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
INTRODUCTION 
Michael T. Cahill* 
The three contributors to this symposium all offer interesting 
and useful empirical material and draw provocative conclusions 
from that material. Any serious student of criminal law should find 
each of these contributions individually compelling and 
informative; together, they practically comprise a primer on 
contemporary issues in and social-science approaches to criminal 
law. 
The articles offer such cumulative impact and utility because 
the authors cover so much ground. While the authors share some 
core concerns as to the criminal justice system’s reputation and as 
to improving the satisfaction of its participants, they offer three 
very different visions of criminal justice. One might say that they 
collectively focus on the “three P’s” of the justice system: 
punishment, procedure, and participation. 
Professor Darley discusses justice as proper punishment.1 That 
is to say, he deals with the substantive question of how to balance 
crime and punishment. In its support for “just deserts” rather than 
an explicitly deterrence-oriented agenda, his vision suggests a 
backward-looking approach: it sees the punishment as a response 
to the crime rather than a purely instrumental means of achieving 
                                                          
 * Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. Many thanks to the other 
participants in the Three Perspectives on Criminal Justice conference, which 
was held at Brooklyn Law School on January 30, 2004, and to Professor Larry 
Solan and the School’s Center for the Study of Law, Language and Cognition 
for organizing it. 
1 See John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospects of Reducing Crime Rates 
by Increasing the Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 189 (2005). 
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some future goal (though he has argued that such a desert-based 
approach also yields utilitarian benefits). 
Professor Heuer examines justice as fair procedure.2 Here too a 
balancing act takes place, but the interests being balanced are those 
of the state (as law enforcer) and the individual accused. One 
might also say that the proceduralist’s vision looks neither 
backward nor forward, but focuses its attention on the present 
moment. That is, the proceduralist is not concerned with the 
relation between the punishment and the crime, or with any 
benefits that might later flow from that punishment, but with the 
nature and propriety of the process that the system employs to 
arrive at the chosen punishment. Heuer’s work suggests that the 
factors underlying the perception of a process as “fair” are 
complex and difficult to pin down, and may include an individual’s 
relative position within the system. 
Professor O’Hara focuses on the system’s participants: the 
people affected by the system, whether defendants, victims, or 
others.3 Her discussion of the role of victims in the criminal 
process implicates a vision of justice as a resolution or 
reconciliation that brings closure and thereby facilitates progress 
for all affected parties rather than merely enabling the state’s 
imposition of punishment on an offender. In her analysis, the 
balance to be achieved directly relates to the interests of the victim 
as well as the wrongdoer. In its ultimately instrumental approach—
its desire for movement toward a better social situation, here 
meaning one in which both offenders and victims are made 
whole—O’Hara’s vision might be described as more forward-
looking than either Darley’s or Heuer’s. O’Hara’s conception may 
also be more aspirational and affirmative, as it seeks the realization 
of some positive good rather than the satisfaction of minimal, 
required goals or rules. 
Though these are very different visions, they are not 
necessarily in direct tension; they are not offered as mutually 
exclusive options that squarely conflict with one another. All three 
                                                          
2 See Larry Heuer, What’s Just About the Criminal Justice System?: A 
Psychological Perspective, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 209 (2005). 
3 See Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 
J.L. & POL’Y 229 (2005). 
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authors identify distinct problems with the present state of the 
criminal-justice system, yet their solutions to these problems seem 
entirely compatible, at least at first glance. Does this mean we can 
have all three of the P’s—just punishment, fair process, and full 
participation—at the same time? Could we create a system that 
reflects all of these values without developing conflicts or 
requiring compromises between them? Or alternatively, are these 
general perspectives so fundamentally at odds as to talk past each 
other, so that any effort to devise concrete, specific methods for 
implementing them will be doomed to incoherence and confusion? 
I offer here no firm conclusion to these questions, only a reminder 
that the apparent harmony of these perspectives might fade when 
they are placed in a particular context that demands specific 
decisions. 
Further, although the three views put forth in the following 
articles are very different, the articles provoke some general 
responses, three of which I will briefly discuss. The first is a 
question about priorities. The debate between substance and 
procedure is hardly new, but both Darley’s and Heuer’s work place 
this debate in a somewhat new context. The authors do not advance 
a principled normative commitment to either substance or 
procedure, nor do they take a clear moral stance as to whether or 
when one should trump the other. Instead, their work poses a 
related but distinct empirical question: not “which is more 
important,” but “which do people think is more important?” 
 Heuer’s work (as well as the larger underlying body of work 
to which he refers) suggests that people care about procedure as a 
value, even independently of the tendency of proper procedures to 
ensure accuracy. At the same time, Darley points to widely shared 
and deeply held intuitions about substantive justice, in that people 
tend to support punishment based on “just deserts.” Of course, 
people desire both fair process and appropriate substantive results. 
This leads us to the question about priorities: how much do people 
care about process as opposed to substance when the two conflict?4 
                                                          
4 The work of Linda J. Skitka, among others, finds that perceptions of the 
significance of procedural fairness recede, perhaps to the point of irrelevance, 
when people consider the substantive outcome to have a moral dimension—as is 
surely true of many criminal cases, possibly to an extent unmatched by any other 
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To be more specific, focusing on an issue in which I take a 
personal interest,5 what happens when there is a categorical 
procedural rule, grounded in notions of fair play, that seems likely 
in many (if not all) cases to impede rather than promote the 
achievement of an accurate outcome on the merits? Do people 
prefer a “fair” process—whatever that means—or a correct result? 
The empirical work of Heuer and others suggests that fairness is a 
thorny, multivariate issue, and the literature thus far strikes me as 
mixed, or else uniformly inconclusive, on this question.6 Perhaps 
                                                          
part of the law. See Linda J. Skitka & David A. Houston, When Due Process Is 
of No Consequence: Moral Mandates and Presumed Defendant Guilt or 
Innocence, 14 SOC. JUST. RES. 305 (2001); see also Linda J. Skitka, Do the 
Means Always Justify the Ends, or Do the Ends Sometimes Justify the Means? A 
Value Protection Model of Justice, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
588 (2002); Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, Understanding Judgments of 
Fairness in a Real-World Political Context: A Test of the Value Protection 
Model of Justice Reasoning, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1419 
(2002); Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, The Dark Side of Moral Conviction, 
2 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 35 (2002). 
5 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: 
HOW, AND WHY, CRIMINAL LAW SACRIFICES DESERT ch.7 (Oxford U. Press, 
forthcoming 2005). 
6 For a discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of morality 
(substance) versus legitimacy (procedure) as methods of inducing compliance, 
see generally Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: 
Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities 
into Account when Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 
724–37 (2000). For indications of the relative importance of substance, see 
works cited supra note 4; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 59-60 & 
Table 5.1 (1990) (study showing that compliance with law has much stronger 
correlation with its connection to “personal morality” than with its perceived 
“legitimacy”); id. at 32-37 (comparing past studies finding higher correlation 
based on law’s instantiation of shared normative views than on perception of 
legitimacy); id. at 60 (“The most important normative influence on compliance 
with the law is the person’s assessment that following the law accords with his 
or her sense of right and wrong[.]”); id. at 68 (“[P]ersonal morality is clearly a 
more important influence on compliance than legitimacy.”); Harold G. 
Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational 
Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 837, 853–54 
(1990); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social 
Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 325, 334 (1980) (stating that certain variables, including 
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O’Hara’s work says something about this debate, at least as it is 
played out in the area of victims’ involvement in the system. There 
is an interesting interplay between victims’ desire to have 
substantive authority over punishment versus mere participation or 
voice in the process.7 Further exploration of this dynamic may 
teach us about the layperson’s perception of the relationship 
between substance and procedure. 
The second issue, which relates to the first, concerns the 
overlaps and distinctions involved in offering a descriptive 
observation as compared to a normative justification or policy 
prescription. A recurring issue with respect to law in a democracy 
is the extent to which law should track people’s preferences (give 
them what they want) and the extent to which law should try to 
shape people’s preferences (tell them, or at least suggest, what to 
                                                          
“moral commitment” and “threat of social disapproval,” act as factors inhibiting 
illegal behavior). 
 For indications of the relative importance of procedure, see TYLER, supra, 
at 63 (“Respondents are almost equally likely to comply with the law because 
they view it as legitimate . . . whether or not they think their peers would 
disapprove of law breaking, and whether or not they think law breaking is 
morally wrong.”); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF 
OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 89 (1989) (“Once a demand is categorized as legitimate, the 
person to whom it is addressed enters a situation where his personal preferences 
become more or less irrelevant . . . .”); id. at 16 (“Through authorization, the 
situation becomes so defined that the individual is absolved of the responsibility 
to make personal moral choices . . . . [A] different kind of morality, linked to the 
duty to obey superior orders, tends to take over.”). See also DAVID BEETHAM, 
THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 4-5 (1991); Mark C. Suchman, Managing 
Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 
579 & n.2 (1995). 
 Indeed, Heuer’s work indicates that substance and fairness perceptions are 
deeply intertwined. For decisionmakers, the two seem almost inseparable. See 
Heuer, supra note 2, at Part II.A. Even for the parties to a legal dispute, a 
complex link between substance and fairness appears to follow from the 
conclusion that notions of “deservingness” (which often seem to be connected to 
the substantive merits of one’s position) are closely tied to perceptions of 
procedural fairness. See Heuer, supra note 2, at Part II.B. 
7 See O’Hara, supra note 3, at 246-47 (noting victim interest in both 
substantive results, such as obtaining conviction, and procedural role, such as 
having a voice in the proceedings, even if participation does not affect outcome). 
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want). This issue resonates with all three authors, in my view, 
because their work relies on empirics, but also often implies policy 
prescriptions. Yet absent an independent normative judgment, data 
about human psychology might suggest at least three very different 
bases for policy: (1) policy should simply follow from our shared 
psychological intuitions; (2) shared psychology is not decisive, but 
suggests a norm that could ground policy choices; or (3) to the 
contrary, sound policy demands active steps to overcome our 
natural psychological inclinations or biases. A fourth option—a 
more modest claim, and perhaps the only one these authors are 
embracing—is that researchers and advocates should simply be 
aware of the empirical data, even if the data’s normative 
implications are up for grabs. 
Tying the second issue directly to the first issue, if research 
indicates that people value process significantly, perhaps even 
more than substantive outcomes, is that a good thing? Should we 
structure the system to reflect that view, or try to shift attitudes 
away from a focus on process and toward attention to just results? 
Further, if apparently process-related issues such as respect depend 
on deservingness, as Heuer indicates, how are judges and others to 
decide how much respect is appropriate, other than by weighing 
the apparent substantive merits? 
Darley hints that lay norms of justice (the desire for desert) 
should inform criminal law doctrine and that the doctrine, in turn, 
may help promote adherence to the law by strengthening respect 
for the underlying norms. But one might ask whether we should 
trust lay intuitions of justice if they are incoherent or not clearly 
morally defensible. On the other side, is the law the best 
mechanism for promoting norms—or for promoting social contexts 
that facilitate adherence to norms—or should we rely on extralegal 
avenues, such as moral instruction in educational or even religious 
institutions? 
The third issue I find relevant to all three articles relates to the 
role of law enforcement as opposed to law. Darley, for example, 
suggests that deterrence is hard to achieve through increasing 
criminal penalties, but I think he would still agree that deterrence is 
important. That forces us, if we still seek to pursue deterrence, to 
focus on increasing either (1) the likelihood of detection, (2) the 
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likelihood of punishment once detected, or (3) the swiftness of 
punishment once detected—or some combination of all three. 
Trying to improve results in any or all of these three areas, 
however, may increase pressure to limit various constitutional or 
procedural rights that stand in the way of doing so. Does Heuer’s 
work offer any indication of how people would react to this? More 
generally, what conclusions can we draw about the relative 
significance of process during a police investigation or even during 
behind-the-scenes plea bargaining, as opposed to what the affected 
parties experience in a trial setting? 
O’Hara discusses the role of victims within the system, but, as 
she acknowledges, one troubling fact is that many victims never 
make it into the system, for various reasons, some having to do 
with their own personalities and some with the system’s view of 
them. What can we do, if anything, to create law-enforcement 
structures that encourage victims to come forward or encourage 
enforcement officials to take seriously all victims who do? 
As the foregoing indicates, I have found all three of the 
following articles highly interesting and provocative. They 
collectively offer a concise introduction to several significant 
modern trends and concerns of criminal law scholarship, and both 
highlight and document the increasing significance of social-
science work to legal theory and doctrine. Of course, even the best 
empirical work cannot resolve the relevant underlying moral 
considerations. It can, however, provide invaluable insights as to 
how we can achieve our goals and, perhaps, about how to structure 
our practical priorities. 
 
